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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
\ 
JOANNE AJDAMS LEISHMAN, I' 
dba SAMAK LODGE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
KAMAS VALLEY LUMBER COMPANY, ' 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. ; 
APPELLANrS BRIEF 
CASE 
N0.10711 
STATEMENT OIF THE KIND OF OASE 
This is an action for compensatory damages brought 
by the Respondent for implied breach of waITanty, the 
basis for the breach of warranty being that the Appellant 
is alleged to have furnished Jaminated beams rto the Re-
spondent, which beams were unsuitable and unm.erohant-
able for the use contemplated by the Respondent and whlch 
use the Appellant allegedly knew. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Corurt granted judgment for the Respondent in the 
amount of $7500 together with interest thereon at the rate 
of six percent (6%) per annum from February 23, 1966. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellants seek an order to amend the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment to conform with 
the facts proved and to reverse to Judgment of t:he trial 
court, or in the alternative an order remanding the ca&> 
to the lower court foc trial. 
STATMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant is a lumber company doing business in 
Kamas, Utah, a small town in southeast Summit County. 
It engages in the general lumber company business and 
manufactures and fabricates lumber products. 
The Respondent Joanne Adams Leishman purchas€<l 
property known as the SAMAK LODGE in March of 1964 
(R 104). It consisted at that time of approximately 10 
acres of ground upon which was located a building which 
had been operated as a private club known as Samak Lodge. 
A point of interest is that "Samak" is "Kamas" spelled 
backward. 
The lodge was located just east of Kia.mas at the mouth 
of Beaver Creek Canyon. The purchase price of the entire 
property was $7500. (TR 104, Interrogatory Answer 2) 
Mrs. Leishman was familiar with the weather condi-
tions at Kamas and was aware that winter often bringS 
heavy snow and ice conditions (TR 122). 
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Mrs. Leishman desired to enlarge the existing struc-
ture on the property into a tavern and restaurant. To ac-
complish this purpose she entered into a business agree-
ment with one Ben Dell of Salt Lake City to build and 
oprrate the tavern. The agreement, in substance, was 
lhat Mr. Dell would supervise and handle the construction 
nt ti1e tavern and would operate it for one year, where-
11ron his efforts would entitle him to be a partner in the 
i11dness (R 33, 114). 
'ihe new structure was to be built over the foundation 
'~: the structure that had collapsed because of previous 
i'lOWS \TR 21) . 
In the forepart orf the year 1964, Mr. Dell and Mrs. 
~ishman drew some rough plans for the construction oon-
(empla ted (TR 35, 115). On the basis of these plans they 
contacted several suppliers C()ll1cerning materials and to get 
quotes. They had determined they would need seven lam-
inated beams of 6" x 12" with variable length size (TR 36). 
In this regard they had consulted with Morrison-Merrill 
Company and with Highland Lumber Company prior to 
ever talking with the Appellant C()ll1cerning the laminated 
beams (TR 9, 35, 117). Dell and Claud Thacker measured 
the old building and determined how many beams they 
would need and that the spacing should be eight feet (TR 
06 J. They had been advised that the same could not be 
supplied by those previously contacted in time for their oon-
tPmplated date to commence construction. This date was 
approximately April of 1964. 
Mrs. Leishman and Mr. Dell contacted the Kamas Val-
ley Lumber Company in the early Spring of 1964 ooncern-
tng the proposed construction. Here the testimony ~ 
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comes conflicting as to the nature of the contract. The di-
verse testimony concerning the beruns is as follows: 
Mrs. Leishman: 
Mr. Dell and she went to the Kamas Valley Lumber 
Company and talked with Mr. Weaver, an employee of 
Kamas Valley Lumber Company. A:t that time, the fin,i 
meeting (March or April of 1964), they just discussed lum-
ber. They did not discuss beams (R 116). 
On the second mooting ,March or April of 1964, both 
she and Mr. Dell were present and they met with Mr. 
Weaver again. They told Mr. Weaver that they had con-
sulted with Morrison-Merrill about the necessary laminat£d 
beams and that company could not supply the neroro beams 
within their time schedule. She says that Weaver said that 
Kamas Valley could supply them with laminated beams 
(TR 116). She said that they (she and Dell) told Weaver 
they would need eight beams (TR 116). She did not ask 
them to design the 'beams for the building (R 122). 
She says that Weaver showed them a sample of the 
beam, and "the sample appeared to be very satisfactory" 
(TR 117) . .A:t the second meeting they placed their order. 
Ben Dell: 
Mr. Dell's version of ordering the laminated beamS is 
considerably different than Mrs. Leishman's. His st.on' 
is: That on the original trip in March of 1964, they did not 
purchase anything; they merely asked about prices (TR 
12). On the second trip, about a week later, he ordered 
certain material. Those present were himself, Mr. weaver, 
Mr .Bannister, and Mr. Wilde, the latter three being em· 
ployees of the Respondent (TR 13). His testimOilY as to 
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whaL was said at the time the beams were ordered is: (TR 
J4) 
"A. The •beams were to be made, that they try to 
make delivery in two weeks if possible, because we were 
hurrying to try to get the building put up, and they said 
they would try to make the two-week delivery; if not, it 
may take three. At that time--
Q. Was anything else said? 
A. The only other thing was that the studding and 
the other materials we ordered would be sent up as we 
nreded them." 
Mr. Weaver: 
Mr. Weaver states that sometime in the Spring of 1964 
Mrs. Leishman and Mr. Dell came to the office inquiring 
aoout prices for material including laminated beams. He 
quoted him a price for the material they said fuey needed 
ITR 146). At the time of the first meeting neither Mr. 
Dell nor Mrs. Leishman indicated how they were going to 
use the material except that they were making an addition 
to the lodge they had purchased (TR 117). 
Mr. Weaver did not have any other conversations with 
Mr. ~ll nor Mrs. Leislunan again until after the beams 
had been delivered (R 147). 
Mr. Bannister: 
Mr. Bannister, an employee of Kamas Valley Lumber 
Company at the time of the beam purchase, testified that 
about April 17, 1964, Mr. Ben Dell came to the business 
I for the purpose of placing certain orders. He knew exactly 
1• ·1 What he wanted. He placed an order for three (3) 6" x 12" 
x 32' beams and four ( 4) 6" x 12" x 28' beams. He (Dell) 
I 
! 
I 
I 
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Said they were going into his construction. He (Dell) did 
not say how they were to be used (TR 165). The order 
was filled and the beams delivered (Exhibit 38, R 166!. 
The beams were constructed and delivered. Some of 
the beams had substantial defects in them in that the joint~ 
had been improperly joined. The joints were finger joints 
that intermesh something like the fingers of botJh hands 
when interlocked. In this case the imperfect joint was 
caused by having one or more of the 2 x 6 boards that 
formed the joints upsidedown at the time of fitting and 
gluing. This caused a space between the end of the finger 
and the vertex of the interlocking joint of the next board 
and also caused one of the boards to be raised from the 
board to which it was to be laminated by a space as much 
as one-fourth of an inch and running several feet in length. 
These defects were obvious to all who looked at them. 
Upon delivery, Mrs. Leishman and Mr. Dell made C'()Jll· 
plaint to the Appellant. The nature of the complaint is 
conflicting: 
Mrs. Leishman: 
Mrs. Leishman says that they complained of both the 
appearance and construction of the beams, but that they 
accepted the ·beams, notwithstanding these defects, at a 
discount (TR 118, 119). She makes no claim that "price" 
was a factor in the discount (TR 118, 119. 
Mr. Dell: 
Mr. Dell sfild they objected to the beams. H'e admit· 
ted they acoopted the beruns at a discount, but he claJinS 
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the discount was not because of defective qwtlity but be-
cause someone else had given similar beams at a smaller 
price and he expected the same price (TR 41) . 
~Ir. Weaver: 
Mr. Dell came in and complained of a beam with a 
crack in it. This was the second time he had seen Mr. 
JJtll. Walt Carrol, the shop manager, and Mr. Weaver 
11rnt up and looked at the beams. Weaver suggested if 
1t1ey still wanted to use them they should put bolts through 
thein. He offered on behalf of the Appellant to furnish 
lhe bolts and pay for the carpenter's (Mr. Thacker) time. 
When he left the job site, Den was satisfied with this ar-
rangement (TR 158, 159). After the building was con-
structed, Weaver told Dell the beams were being placed too 
far apart to support the roof (TR 151). 
Ward Blazzard: 
A short time after the discount was given and before 
the credit memos were filed, Mr. Blaz:rerd inquiTed of his 
employees concerning the reason for the discount. T1his 
ll'as in the forepart of May of 1964. Upon learning the 
reason. he marked the credit memo to read as follows: 
ITR 183). 
"Adjustment of price due to dissatisfaction in laminating" 
All of the witnesses agreed that at the time the de-
fective condition of the beams was discovered, the beams 
had not yet been installed in the building. At this time 
no one from Kamas Valley Lumber Company knew how 
the beams were to be used or the dimensions of the struc-
ture. 
Mrs. Leishman and Mr. Dell had employed Claude 
Thacker and his sorn Don Thacker to help in the construe. 
tion. Mr. Claude Thacker was a carpenter with 40 years 
of experience. Mr. Claude Thacker testified concerning 
the facts. The substance of his testimony was that [;.ell 
had a rough sketch from which he worked (TR 175) 
When Dell wanted something he went to the Kamas Valley 
Lumber Company to get it. He, Mr. Thacker, told him, 
Dell, at the time that he did not think the beams were 
strong enough for the use intended (TR 177, 180). 
As the structure went up, it became obvious to Mr. 
Cladue Thacker that the beams would not hold the in· 
tended wei~ht. He testified that he told Dell the beams 
wouldn't hold ·and that there was too much space between 
centers (TR 177). 
Claude Thacker testified that when walking on the 
roof there was more than a normal amount of spring or 
give which indicated a lack of strength to him (TR 177). 
He told Dell about it and Dell was unconcerned (TR 177). 
Claude Thacker also testified that he had lived in the 
Kamas area 22 years and was aware of winter conditions 
(TR 177). He advised Dell to put a good strong post un· 
der each beam when he left for the winter since the beam 
was not strong enough to hold up the roof (TR 190). 
Don 'Dhacker testified that the beams were obviouslY 
defective and that fact was called to the attention of Mr. 
Dell by his father (TR 198). He further testified that be-
fore the beams were installed his father told Dell he would 
have to put them on four-foot centers (TR 200) · Don 
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Thacker said tlhat when he would walk on the beams after 
they were installed they would give an iooh in the middle 
(TR 200) , so he and his father advised tDell to put props 
or braces under each beam when he left in the fall (TR 
200). Mr. Dell argued with Mr. Claude Thacker about the 
;;pacing between the beams (TR 202) . 
Bath Robert Bannister and Bill Weaver warned Dell 
that there was too much space between the centers of the 
beams (TR 151, 171). Bannister also told Dell that the 
beams should not be placed on more than four-foot ren-
ters (TR 171). Dell ignored this advice (TR 171, 190). 
The building was constructed generally as shown on 
t\hibit 37, which is labeled "roof plan." This plan was 
drawn by Mr. William Weaver (Exhibit 36), but to which 
Ralph L. Wadsworth, a Consulting Engineer, added beams 
"A", "B", and "C". 'Dhe plan indicates tlhat the beams 
were generally on eight foot centers with 1Jhe exception of 
the angle area whiich had as much as a ten-foot spread be-
tween centers. 
Both the Appellant and Respondent produced expert 
witnesses in the form of engineers, both of whom testified 
that the beams, if they had been of average construction, 
with expected allowable live load carryiing capacities, would 
not, design-wise, have carried the expected load in that 
area (TR 83, 130). Wadsworth was emphatic that the 
roof would have failed regardlesc; of the quality of the 
beam, (TR 131, 135) , and that the cause of failure was 
\hat it was inadequately designed (TR 131) and construc-
ted (TR 131) . 
The building was constructed and completed in July 
of 1964, and operated as a tavern and restaurant until the 
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close of the season, approximately November of 1964. Mrs. ! 
Leishman and Mr. Dell returned to Salt Lake in the Fall. 
Neither took any corrective measures to brace the beams 
or the roof (TR 190). 
On or about February 23, 1965, part of the buildino 
" roof collapsed. It was in this part of the structure that 
the laminated beams were used. 
Mrs. Leishman was the sole witness concerning dam-
ages. After being placed on the witness stand four times 
for the purpose of proving damages and with some assis-
tance in the way of counsel from the Court on w:hat the 
measure of damages is in a case of this nature, (R 49, 105), 
Mrs. Leishman testfied that the pmperty was worth $25,. 
000.00, (TR 105), before the roof fell, and was worth 
$7,500.00 after (TR 105). This is the only proof of dam-
ages offered by the Plaintiff. 
On examination, Mrs. Leishman testified to the fol-
lowing fucts: 
1. The entire property oost her initially $7500.00 (TR 
104). 
2. Her entire expenditure on the project, inch .. 'ding 
labor for herself and Dell, was $6,538. 29 (TR 104), which 
included the following items which had been or could be 
salvaged or had not been in the building at the time of its 
collapse: (See Exhibit 35, TR 109, 110) Tools, 20.41; safe, 
75.00; furnace, 50.00; concrete 236.07; table lamps, 9.68; 
antique server, 15.00; windows, 50.00 (one-half of 101.98): 
$tove, 67.28; grill, 232.87; sink, 86.30; sink, 78.00; dishe' 
and silverware, 1,035.20 (Note: these were stolen before 
collapse); plumbing fixtures, 749.15 (Note: 1Jhese are not 
even in this building); cooler, 284.62; licenses, insurance and 
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legal fees, 987.19; doors, 80.58. By her own testimony, the 
tntal maximum cost of the building alone, which was dam-
aged, exclusive of the salvage value of lumber, electrical 
wiring (TR 108), etc., was $4,057.35. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING TI:IAT TI:IERE 
HAD BEEN IMPLIED WARRANTY FROM THE AP-
PELLANT TO THE RESPONDENT OF THE FITNESS 
FOR USE OF THE BEAMS FOR TI:IE PARTICULAR 
l1SE TO WHICH THEY WERE ULTIMATELY PUT. 
In this case the testimony is unrefuted that the Plain-
tiff prepared a list of material before ever contacting the 
appellant (TR 35, 36, 116, 146, 147, 165). She and Mr. 
Drll had contacted both Morrison-Merrill and Hi-Land 
Lumber Company, material furnishers in Salt Lake City, 
before contacting the Appellant. In this case they ordered 
hy sample (TR 117). The furnished beams were patently 
defective and did not conform to the sample, and both 
Leishman and ~11 knew it (TR 118, 119). 
The law in Utah, in force at the time of the Respond-
nt's transaction with the Appellant, was what we know 
generally as the "Uniform Sales Act", Title 60 Sa1es Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
Under this act the follOIWing provisions seem clear and 
applicable: 
"If the buyer has examined the goods, there is no im-
plied warranty as regards defects which examination 
ought to have revealed." 
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In this case the buyer inspected the goods (TR 118, 
19), and with admissions on the part of the Plaintiff that 
the defects were obvious to her and to Dell (TR 19, 118, 
119). 
The questions of what duties and responsibilities de-
volve upon the Respondent by the knowledge she had of 
the defective condition of the beams are taken up under 
POINT 9, concerning contributory negligence and assum1>-
tion of risk. 
If the buyer bought by sample as she says she did. 
(TR 117) , then the only warranty under the law is that 
the bulk will conform with the sample. 
"60-1-16. Implied warranties in sale by sample. In 
the case of a contract to sell or a sale by sample: 
(1) There is an implied warranty that the bulk 
shall correspond with the sample in quality. 
(2) There is an implied warranty that the buyer 
shall have a reasonable opportunity of comparing the 
bulk with the sample, except as far a:s otherwise pro-
vided in 60-3-7 ( 3) . 
( 3) If the seller is a dealer in goods of that kind, 
there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be 
free from any defect rendering them unmerohant.able 
which would nort be apparent on reasona;ble examina· 
tion of the sample." 
In this case the Plaintiff concedes that the goods did 
not conform to the sample and she received a price adjust· 
ment accordingly. It is obvious that 1Jhere could be no 
warranty under the provision of 60-1-16. 
· rder The next argument that must be made is that m 0 
for there to have ibeen an implied warranty tmder the pr<>- ! 
I 
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visions of U.C.A. 60-1-15, the Seller must know the particu-
lar purpose for which the goods are required, and it must 
appear that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judg: 
rnent. 
It is respectfully submitted that under 1Jh.e facts of this 
case the claimed warranty must fail not only under the 
question of reliance which will be taken up under POINT 
4 follorwing but for the following reasons: 
1. The Plaintiff ordered by specification (TR 35, 36). 
She kne-w exactly what she wanted (TR 115). She did 
not request the Appellant to advise her concerning where 
to locate the beams she had ordered: (TR 119) 
"A. I remember them being in contact with the build-
ing. 
Q. But you don't remember anyone from Kamas Val-
ley Lumber Company telling you where to place the beams? 
A. I do not." 
2. The Appellant had no knowledge of the spacing of 
the beams. Merely to have known they were for roof sup-
port is insufficient to impose liability. The Appellant would 
have had to have intimate knowledge at the time of the sale 
concerning how the beams were to be used before liability 
would ensue. 
The court's findings of fact number 2 to 1Jh.e effect 
that "Plaintiff advised Defendant of the use to which the 
beams would be placed" is inadequate to impose liability, 
even if there were evidence to support it. 
To impose liability the Court must necessarily find 
that the Appellant knew not only the intended use of the 
~a.ms but the technical manner of the intended use. The 
14 
findings of fact in this regard are entirely silent as to such 
essential conclusion. For example, the testimony of the 
employees of the Appellant, the carpenter of the Respond-
ent, and both experts was uniform in saying that the beams 
would have been adequate if placed on four (4) foot cen-
tern, but inadequate otherwise. 
To demonstrate more clearly that the Caurt found just 
the reverse of what is necessary to impose liability, the 
Court struck from the initial findings of fact submitted to 
it, (finding of fact number 2) after the words "the beam1 
would be placed" the following language: "and solicited 
from the defendant their recommendations as to the type 
of beam which ought to be suitable and merchantable for 
the contemplated use." 
It is clear, therefore, that the Court did not think that 
the Appellant had more knowledge tJhan the fact that the 
beam ordered by the Respondent was to be used to support 
the roof. It is certainly clear that the Court believed that 
the Appellant made no recommendation as to the type of 
beam that might be suitable. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT 
THE BUYER FAILED TO GIVE NOTICE OF THE 
BREACH OF WARRANTY. 
"That The Court by finding of fact number 1, st.ates 
' d 
the plaintiff and her attorneys gave defendant a due an 
proper notice of the failure of the beams and the colla~ 
of the roof when it came to plaintiff's attention." 
. · pplicable 
The particular language of the code provISIOil a 
to this finding is: 
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"But if, after acceptance of the goods, the buyer fails 
tu give notice to the Seller of the breach of any pro-
mis2 Ol' warranty within a reasonable time after the 
buyc·r knows, or ought to know, of such breach, the 
S2ller shcill not be liable therefor." 
It is respectfully submitted that the breach of war-
ranty, if any, became knorwn to the Respondent on approxi-
rn~i'._']/ Nfay 22, 1964, the date the beams were delivered. 
Acceptance of the goods after knowledge of their defective 
concli1ion i·elieves the seller of any liability thereunder. 
Following further the reasoning above stated, the code 
turther states: 
"Where the goods have been delivered to the buyer he 
cannot rescind the sale, if he knew of the breach of 
warranty when he accepted 1Jhe goods, eic." 
While the above provision pertains to rights of rescis-
oion, nevertheless, it spells out that the buyer's rights ac-
r111e at the time of discovery orf the breach, and not later, 
and that is the time when notice must be given. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THJAT THE AP-
PELLANT REPRESENTED THAT THE BEAMS SOLD 
WOULD STAND THE WEIGHT OF UP TO FOUR FEET 
OF SNOW. 
The Respondent blithely prepares a finding of fact 
nLUnber 3 stating "1Jhat they (the beams) would stand the 
weight of up to four feet of snow with the contemplaOOd 
use of the beams placed on eight foot centers." 
Nowhere in the record is there any cla.1m that the~ 
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fendant represented that the beams would stand the weight 
of up to four feet of snow. This is a rchild born without 
the aid of a mother. There is absolutely no pleading, tes-
timony or evidence to the effect that the Seller ever made 
such a representation. 
If this is a finding upon which the Court relied to grant 
judgment to the Respondent, then we respectfully submit 
that we are entitled to have the judgment reversed. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF RELIED UPON A REPRESENTATION OF 
THE DEFENDANT AS TO FITNESS FOR TIIE PARTIC-
ULAR USE TO WHICH THE BEAMS WERE PUT. 
It seems inconceivable that the Court could find that 
the Respondent relied upon a representation of fitness of 
use under the circumstances of this case. A summary of 
circumstances negating reliance are as follows: 
1. Leishman knew of the potential snow danger in 
the Kamas area (TR 122). 
2. Dell knew of the potential snow danger in the 
Kamas area (TR 21). 
3. The beams were patently defective (TR 24). 
4. Leishman sought a rebate because of the defective 
conditions of the beams (TR 183) . 
5. A rebate was granted 'because of the defective con· 
dition of the beams (TR 183). 
6. Weaver told them to put bolts in the beaillS (TR 
158, 159). 
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7. Weaver told them to put the beams on four-foot 
centers (TR 151). 
8. Bannister told them the beams would not hold as 
placed and to place them on four-foot centers (TR 171). 
9. Claude Thacker told them to put beams on smal-
ler centers, that they wouldn't hold otherwise (TR 177, 
180). 
10. Don Thacker told of argwnents back and forth 
between Dell and his father rega.nling the structural de-
' fects in the beams and their inability to sUpport the ex-
pected load (TR 202). 
11. Thacker advised Respondent to put braces under 
beams during the winter time (TR 177, 200). 
To have relied on the ability of the beams to support 
the expected sn()IW load in the fact of such overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary is unbelievable. This, connected 
with the fact that if the beams had been perfect they wottld 
not have supported the snow load makes reliance on "im-
plied" quality absolutely imposstble. 
POINT V 
TH!E COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
BEAMS WERE NOT AS STRONG AS THEY APPEARED. 
In finding of fact nwnber 7, the Court found "that said 
laminated beams were not as structurally sound and strong 
as they appeared and should have been, if properly manu-
factured." 
This finding is difficult 1n understand. How strong 
did they appear? They had large gaps in them. They 
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were obviously poorly laminated. They were obviously not 
properly manufactured. 
We submit this finding means nothing except that the 
Respondent must have assumed the risk the appearance of 
such beams gave. The beams bespoke of weakness. What 
more could she assume from their appearance? 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING TIIAT THE 
BUILDING COLLAPSED BY REASON OF DEFECTIVE 
BEAMS. 
The fact is the building would have collapsed regard· 
less of the beams. This finding should have been "tbe 
building collapsed because of inadequate design." 
Joseph F. Patrick, the Respondent's engineer, testified 
that the proper design for this area would have assumed 
a "forty-five pound unit for imposed live loading" (TR 83. 
An anticipated live load in this area should have anticipated 
at least 45 lbs. per square foot, according to Mr. Patrick, 
(TR 83), and yet the maximum load these beams would 
have supported would have been 30 lbs. per square footu 
they had been perfect, (TR 83) and allowing no safety fac· 
tor for wood variables (TR 84). Mr. Patrick testified that 
the decking would not hold a thirty pound per square foot 
live load (TR 91). He further testified that proper wood 
design required a substantial margin of error because 01 
the peculiar characteristics of wood. Wood is extremely 
unpredictable, and in these beams and decking there would 
have been no margin of error if they had been perfect (TR 
92). 
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General design practice would have assumed a beam 
ril this dimension composed of Douglas fir lumber, and 
11 oulcl have had an allowable 2400 PSI (pounds per square 
inch). (Patrick TR 63, Wadsworth TR 127). Wadsworth 
testified that had these beams been perfect according to 
e1pf'ccecl stanclards and placed in the span that they were, 
Eeam 'A" \vould have supported 19 lbs. per sq. ft. allow-
able load, Beam "B" would have supported 27 lbs. allowable 
11\c Joacl, and Beam "C" would have supported 14 lbs. allow-
; iJJ:: live load (TR 129, Exhibit 37. 
In respect to the decking used over the beam expanse, 
had 1he beams been adequate it would have supported only 
the following: 
Deck Span 
8' O" 
9' 4" 
10' O" 
11' 6" 
Lbs. Per Sq. Ft. 
Allowable Live Load 
41 
21 
13 
4 
(TR 130, 131) 
Testimony was introduced and pictures were introduced 
sho11ing heavy accumulations of snow and ice on the roof. 
Both expert \\-itnesses testified that such snorw and ice meas-
urements would have given live load weight per square foot 
of greater than 45 pounds (TR 83, 127). 
It was clearly demonstrated that under the circum-
stances of this case the roof would have collapsed even if 
the beams had been perfect. It is further evidence that a 
'
0ction of the deck span would have collapsed in any event 
the beams collapsed. 
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Both expert witnesses testified that if one beam or onp 
section of decking collapsed substantial additional burden 
would be immediately thrust upon the remaining beams 
and decking and one would expect further collapse in a 
form of chain reaction (TR 87). 
We submit that there is not a scintilla of evidence to 
support the finding that the roof collapsed because of de 
fective beams. Recognizing that the ordinary rule a.pplit'd 
to finding of fact by the trial court is that if there is sub-
stantial evidence in the reoord to support the findings of 
fact, they will be sustained. O'Gara v. Findlay, 6 U. 2d 
102, 306 P. 2d 1073. Notwithstanding this rule, we respect-
fully submit that the evidence is clear that the roof col 
lapsed not because of defective beams but because of ex-
cessive spacing---or, to put it as the engineer did, "becaUSP 
of inadequate design" (TR 131). The Appellant believes 
that there is no evidence in the record to support a find· 
ing that the roof collapsed because of defective beams per 
se. 'Dhe mere fact that the roof would collapse sooner or 
under a smaller weight because of the defects in these 
beams is not a sound reason to say that the beams were 
the cause of the collapse. The proximate cause was defec· 
tive design of the building and intrinsic strength of the 
beam. 
POINT VII 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF HAD NO REASON TO KNOW THAT THE 
BEAMS PURCHASED FROM THJE DEIFENDANT WERE 
OF INFERIOR QUALITY OR TIIAT TIIEY WERE 
STRUCTURALLY DEIFFEITVE 
'd "That In finding of fact number 10 the Court Sal: : 
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plaintiff did not know or have reason to know that the 
beams as purchased from defendant were of inferior qual-
ity and laminations or that they were structurally defec-
tive." 
Finding af fact number 10 requires the Court to ig-
no1e substantial, and in the Appellant's opinion, irrefutable 
evidence to the contrary. The evidence that we think 
clearly demonstrates the Respondent's knowledge of 1Jhe 
defective and structurally unsound nature af the beams 
has been partially set out in the argument under POINT 
4 above. We respectfully call the Court's attention to the 
evidence of the Respondent's knowledge listed in Items 1 
through 11 on pages 16 and 17 of this brief. 
No point was more adequately demonstrated by the 
Appellant and Respondent than the defective quality of 
the bean1S and their knowledge of it. Tiris finding, because 
of its flight from fact, is especially frustrating to the Ap-
pellant. 
POINT VIII 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT S'E'ITLE HER COMPLAINT CON-
CERNING THE STRUCfURAL QUALITY OF THE 
BEAMS BY RECEIVING A REDUCTION IN PRICE. 
Under U.C.A. 1953 as amended 60-5-7, it is said: 
"Remedies fur breach of warranty: 
(1) Where there is a breach of warranty by the Seller, 
the Buyer may at his election: 
(a) Accept the goods, ,and set up against the Sel-
ler a breach of warranty by way of reooupment in 
diminution or extinction of the price. 
(2) When the Buyer has claimed and been granted 
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a remedy in a:ny one af these ways, no other remPcly 
can thereafter be granted." 
In the statement of facts we set forth the testimony 
of Mrs. Leishman conceming the rebate (TR 118, 119). Jn 
addition to that testimony is the testimony of Mr. Blaz-
zard (TR 183), all to the effect that the price adjustment 
was because of the defective quality of the beams. 
At the trial the only testimony to the contrary was 
that of Mr. Dell to the effect that the price was adjusted 
because someone else had purchased beams at a smaller 
price (TR 41). We respectfully submit that this testimony 
(Dell's) is not sufficient to overcome the testimony of all 
the other witnesses and especially Mrs. Leishman's. We 
think that the testimony of Mrs. Leishman is binding upon 
her, especially since she is the party to this action. 
It is a fundamental rule that a party may take the 
testimony offered by the adverse party in the light most 
favorable to him and that the testimony of a party has 
great weight against him. See Jones on Evidence, Vol. 4, 
p. 1855, Sec. 984, 20 Am.Jr. 1032, Sec. 1181, Fowler v. Pleas· 
ant Valley Coal Company, 16 U. 348, 52 P. 594. 
In the present case, where Mrs. Leishman admits that 
the rebate was given because af appearance and structural 
defects, it would matter not if there were an additional 
reason for rebate. When she took the rebate under the 
code section cited above, she barred herself from any other 
relief because of claimed breach of warranty. Her testi· 
mony in this regard coupled with the testimony of BaJUlis· 
ter and Blazzard should be conclusive against her. 
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POINT IX 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FINID THE 
PLAINTIFF WAIVED HER RIGHrr TO CLAIM BREACH 
OF WARRANTY OR WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBU-
TORY NEGLIGENCE IN RESPECT TO THE USE OF 
TI-IE BEAMS OR IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF USING THE 
BEAMS. 
All of the testimony above set forth and all of the ar-
guments proffered in respect to the other points set forth 
above apply with even more force and effect against the 
[Jrindples of waiver, contributory negligence and assump-
tion of risk. Because we have clearly set forth 1Jhe facts 
that show use after knowledge of the defect, we shall ad-
dress ourselves to the authorities supporting our belief of 
the application of these defenses. 
"As a general rule, damages which have been caused 
by the continued use of a defective article, after the 
buyer has beoome aware that it does not conform to 
the warranty, are not recoverable in an action or coun-
terclaim based on breach of warranty. 
In the absence of special circumstances, such as the 
seller's insistence on the continued use of the article 
or denial that it is defective, or the likelihood of great-
er damage resulting to the buyer by discontinuing than 
by continuing its use, the purchaser has no right to 
continue using a defective article, after he has learned 
of the defect, if; the result of such use is to increase 
the damage resulting from the defect." (33 A.L.R. 2d, 
514) 
"Allowance to the buyer as damages for the furnishing 
of forty pound instead of fifty pound beams of not only 
24 
the difference in value of tJhe beams, but other itenio 
of damage, such as setting the beams in the building 
under construction, removing and taking out the beams 
and rebuilding the walls, on the theory that the buyer 
did not discover that the beams were lighter until after 
they were set in the walls, was held error in Hawkins 
vs. Deitz (1899) 27 Misc. 200, 57 NYS 751, where the 
buyer had se€n the beams before delivery and also at 
the site of the building, and they were plainly marked 
with the figures "40", indicating their weight, and the 
buyer testified that he could tell one from the other 
"as soon as he saw it." The appellate court observe!\ 
that the fact that the buyer's employees put the beams 
into the building and enclosed them in masonry or 
brickwork the morning after their delivery, in the buy. 
er's absence, did not excuse him for his negligen<l! 
since the acts of his employees must be deemed his 
acts. ( 41 A.L.R. 2d, p. 1177) 
"The later cases adhere to the rule that a purchaser 
of personal property may waive or lose the right to 
rescind the contract for fraud, breach of warranty, or 
failure of the article purchased to conform to the con· 
tract, if he uses it in his business or otherwise as h~ 
own property, for his own benefit or convenience, and 
not merely for testing or preserving it, after he has 
knowledge of the grounds for rescission." (Advan<l!· 
Rumely Thresher Company, Inc. v. Stohl, 75Utah124 
283 P. 731; Knudsen Music Company v. Masterson, 121 
Utah 252, 240 P. 2d 973; 41 A.L.R. 2d, 1177, Williston 
Sales, Rev. Ed. Sec. 611) 
"It is well settled that a purchaser of personal propert;, 
may waive or lose the right to rescind the contract for 
breach of warranty or failure of the article purchaser 
to conform to the contract, if he uses it in his busin~ 
or otherwise as his own property, for his own ben~fit 
or convenience, and not merly for testing or p1~rvnig , 
I 
I 
I 
it, after he has knowledge of the grounds for rescis-
sion. While in many of the cases the fact that the 
property, because of the use, had necessarily deterior-
ated to some extent in value seems to have been a fac-
tor in the holding that such use precluded rescission. 
there is authority which denies the right of rescission 
where there has been use, even though apparently such 
use did not result in substantial diminution in value of 
the property. Moreover, after an attempted rescission 
by the buyer of chattels, which the seller has not ac-
cE'pted, the buyer if he intends to rely upon it, must 
adhere thereto and act consistently therewith, and if 
he thereafter continues to use the property as his own, 
he may be held to have waived or abandoned the re-
scission, and may be precluded from rescinding or as-
serting a claim that he has rescinded; in other words, 
the use of chattels sold, by the purchaser, after the sel-
ler has refused the latter's tender of them in a rescis-
sion of the contract defeats the attempted rescission,if 
the property was used for the personal benefit of the 
purchaser, and not merely in compliance with his duty 
as bailee of the seller. This doctrine finds support in 
numerous cases. It is no excuse for the continued use 
and consumption that it was required by the exigen-
cies of the buyer's business, and it is also immaterial 
that the buyer, while continuing to use and consume 
the property, made objections to the quality. The fact 
that the further use or consumption of the goods, after 
knowledge of defects in quality, was for the purpose 
of establishing evidence of their defective quality will 
not prevent such use from constituting a waiver of the 
right to return." (46 Am.Jr. 895, Sec. 765) 
While the arbove citation refers to the right of rescis-
sion, it is clear that the same rule applies to a right of dam-
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ages under U.C.A. 60-5-7. Rescission is only one of the al 
terna te rt:medies. 
"In spite orf his negligence, a seller is, of course, not 
liable therefor to a buyer who, by his own neglignt con. 
duct, has contributed to the injury. And while the 
use of the purchased article in a particular manner 
which would otherwise appear to be negligent may Ix 
proper where the buyer relies, and has a right to relr. 
upon the seller's assurance that it is sarfe to use the 
article after he discovers the danger will be held to 
have asswned all the risk of damage to himself, not· 
Withstanding the seller's assurance orf sarfety." 
(46 AM.Jr. 931, Sec. 807) 
The question of the application orf the rule of contribu· 
tory negligence in a case that fits in a contract category 
causes some academic consternation. While there is not 
a wealth of authority using the term "contributory negli· 
gence", the acts of the parties which give rise to defellS(s 
are interchangeably described as waiver, assumption of risk, 
and occasionally negligence. 
The general rule is that the defense of contributory 
negligence, except where the common law rule is abbro-
gated by statute, is appropriately invoked in negligence ac· 
tions, while the defense orf assumtion orf risk is applicable 
to cases involving consensual or contractural relationsltlp 
between the parties. 82 A.L.R. 2d 1222. At least in the 
area orf sale and warranty of seed, however, the cases oc· 
casionally talk about the negligence of t:he buyer, 16 A.L.R 
896, 32 A.L.R. 1247, and 117 A.L.R. 481. Among the cases 
cited in the annotations are Paul's Valley Mill CompanY 1· 
Gabbert, 78 P. 2d 685, 182 Okla. 500, 117 A.L.R. 466 (1938.I 
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In tills case the buyer was denied consequential damages 
where he examined the seed oats and knew that they were 
not the kind he had ordered, but planted them anyway. 
Another case cited by A.L.R. is Tomita v. Johnson, 290 
Pac. 395, 49 Idaho 643, (1930). Here an experienced po-
tato grower was held to have known by sight that the seed 
p0tat0€s sold were not the ones he had ordered and that 
rmt of the seed had spoiled and tJhat most of the balance 
or the potatoes were diseased. Having planted with this 
knowledge, he was not allowed to recover for crop failure. 
None of these cases go so far as to state that contribu-
tory negligence is being used as a defense. In fact, neither 
of the cases just cited so much as mentions the word "neg-
ligence", ''due care" or "contributory negligence'', but they 
are citerl in American Law Reports under the heading "Ef-
(Ed of Negligence of Buyer for Failure to Mitigate Dam-
age." 
It has also been held where the buyer, by an inspection 
before acceptance, might have discovered the defective con-
dition of the seed or other articles, the same result obtains; 
however, the cases talk in terms of waiver orf the breach, 
not in terms of contributory negligence. 16 A.L.R. 896. 
Language suggesting contributory negligence as a de-
fense to breach of contract has occasionally been used in 
connection with implied warranties of fitness of livestock. 
According to 53 A.L.R. 2d 897, Sec 3(c), inspection and 
JJatent defects, where the physical disease or defects of an 
animal purchased were discovera:ble by "ordinary care" or 
where the buyer had "not exercised due care" the warranty 
~not breachd and the buyer "assumes the risk." 
lt might be implied that the defense of contributory 
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negligence was the basis for the decision in McCormick 1 •• 
Hoyt, 333 P. 2d 639, 53 Wash 2d 338 (1959). Here a re 
covery under the theory of breach of warranty of fitne:,., 
of goods was denied to the buyers where ample opportunity 
to inspect was offered but refused. The position of the 
preceding case has been supported in Utah since Jan. 
uary 1966 by the Uniform Cbmmercial Code, Section 2. I 
01G(3)b, which supercedes 60-1-15(3) Utah Code Anno- I 
tated: 
I 
"(b) When the buyer before entering into the contr.;1t / 
has examined the goods or the sample or model :is I 
fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods 11 
there is no implied warranty with regard to defo:ts 
which an examination ought in the circumstances tu ; 
have revealed to him." / 
The Appellant respectfully submits that regardless of 
the label attached, whether it be waiver, assumption of 
risk or contributory negligence, the Plaintiff by her con· 
duct is barred from recovering in this case. 
I 
POINT x I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THIE RESPOND· ' 
ENT SUFFERED DAMAGES IN TIIE AMOUNT OF 
$7500.00. 
. I 
Perhaps the Appellant made a mistake in not shOWJll1 / 
what the Respondent's actual damages were, even thougn j 
liability for such was denied; however, it appeared to thr 
1 
Appellant that the proof of damages was so totally deficient 
that the Plaintiff could not recover. i 
dent i 
In this instance the first attempt by the Respon · i 
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at damages was to offer proof of the earning capacity of 
the business (TR 5). The next attempt was to show the 
cost of construction (TR 49, 95). It was not until the 
Court advised the Respondent as to what the measure of 
damages truly was that Mrs. Leishman testified that the 
value of the premise before the collapse was $25,000.00 and 
after the collapse was $7500.00 (TR 105). No other evi-
dence was offered. 
What she took into consideration in arriving at those 
tigures was never disclosed. In fact the figures were so 
totally mythical as to be incredible. It is apparent that 
the Court did not believe them. 
If the Corurt did not believe the testimony offered con-
cerning damages, what did it believe? The only conclu-
sion that one can come to is that the Court speculated as 
to the Respondent's damage. 
The iule concerning damages in this case shoruld have 
been: 
"In the case of an injury of a permanent nature to real 
property, the proper measure of damages is the dimi-
nution in the market value of the property by reason 
of that injury, or in other words the difference 1between 
the value of the land before the injury and its value 
after the injury." (22 Am. Jur. 2d. 194, Sec. 134) 
Generally speaking, the Courts have said that market 
value means "fair market value", and the accepted defini-
tion of "fair market value" is: 
"The highest price estimated in terms orf money which 
the property will bring if exposed for sale in the open 
market by a seller who is willing to sell, allowing a 
reasonable time to find a buyer who is willing but not 
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obliged to buy, both parties having full knowldgt> of a!I 1 
uses to which it is adapted and for which it is capaLle ' 
of being used." (Definition used by General Sen~ee.' 
Administration, United States of America, State v. Te-
desco, 4 Utah 2d 248, 291 P. 2d 1028.) 
There is absolutely no testimony in this case concern. 
ing "fair market value" of the property before and after thr 
collapse of the roof. 
'Wi L ;out admitting that the~e is any evidence of foi: , 
market vdae, the1·2 still aris-2s the question concerning the 11 
adequacy of proof necessary to sustain the Plainiffs bur 
den. In this regard the follorwing citations may be helpfuJ I 
"'~ * * To authorize a recovery for more than nomim. I 
damages. facts must exist and be shoWY'. by the r,1. I 
dence ~h~ch afford a. reasonable basis fo1· measw.:n; I 
the plamt1ff's loss. The damages must be suscept11ile , 
0£ ascertainment in some manner other than by spec j 
ulation, conjecture, or surmise and by reference to sow 
fairly definite standard, such as market value, esta~ 
lished experience, or direct inference from known cir 
cwnstances. '' 
22 Am.Jur. 2d, 46, s~. 26 Restatement of Contract. 
Sec. 331. 
"The burden of proof, of corurse, is on the plaintiff \I! 
prove his damages with rea:sona:ble certanty." ~ 
meroli v. Austin Trailer Equipment Co. (California! 
227 P. 2d 923. 
"It is established law that where a plaintiff proves a 
breach of a contractual duty he is entitled to darnag~ 
however when he offers no proof of actual damagr 
or the ~roof is vague or speculative, he is entitled 1'' 
no more than nominal damages." Roth v. Sped> 
of Col.) 126 A. 2d 153, 61 A.L.R. 2d 1004. 
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In the case of Gilmore v. Cohen (Ariz.) 386 P. 2d. 81, 
the plaintiffs were given options to buy certain property 
by the defendants. The defendants breached the contract. 
The plaintiffs put in proof that if the defendants had horn-
orerl the contract they would have made the same profit om 
the property to be purchased that they had made on the 
property already purchased. The trial court allowed only 
nominal damages. The Supreme Court said: 
"The only question remaining for our consideraLon is 
whether, on the basis of the evidence presented, it was 
error for the trial judge to limit his award to nominal 
damages. The burden was on the plaintiffs to show 
the amount of their damages with reasonable certainty. 
Jacob v. Ciner, supra; Martin v. LaFon, 55 Ariz. 196, 
100 P. 2d 182 (1940). It is firmly established, of 
course. in this state as elsewhere, that "certainty in 
amount" of damages is not essential to recovery when 
the FACT of damage is proven. Story Parchment Co. 
\. Patterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 51 
S.Ct. 248, 75 L.Ed. 544 (1931); Grumfmel v. Hollen.-
stein, 90 Ariz. 356, 367 P. 2d 960 (1962); Brear v. 
Klinker Sand & Gravel Co., 60 Wash. 2d 443, 374 P. 2d 
370 (1962). This is simply a recognition that doubts 
as to the extent of the injury should be resolved in fa-
vor of the innocent plaintiff and against the wrong-
doer. But it cannot dispel the requirement that the 
plaintiff's evidence provide some basis for estimating 
his loss. This court stated in McNutt Oil & Refining 
Co. v. D'Ascoli, 79 Ariz. 28, 281 P. 2d 966 (1955), that 
'conjecture or speculation' cannot provide the basis 
for an award of damages, and said in Martin v. LaFon, 
supra, that the evidence must make an 'approximately 
accurate estimate' ~ible." 
We respectfully contend that in this case, as in the 
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Arizona case cited above, the evidence must make an "a 
- -·-·------ j} 
proximately accurate estimate" possible. Where th;;;~Y 
evidence offered was that the damages were $17,500.00, 
that is hardly a basis for a "reasonably accurate" judgment 
of $7500.00. 
We believe the argument above tendered is even more 
1 
convincing when considered in the ligiht that the Respond- 1 
I 
ent had invested only $4,057.35 in the damaged property J 
within nine months of the date of damage and that such · 
I 
figure does not take into consideration the salvage value I 
of such material left. I 
POINT XI I 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE I 
APPELLANT A NEW TRIAL AND IN FAILING TO I 
SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AFTER DISCOVERING 
THAT IT HAD MISINTERPRETED THE TESTIMONY 
OF W. WARD BLAZZARD, WHICH MISINTERPRETA· 
TION WAS THE PRIMARY BASIS FOR GRANTING 
JUDGMENT FOR THE RESPONDENT. 
'During the trial the Appellant offered a credit memo-
randum with the notation "adjustment of price due to dis-
satisfaction in laminating." The memorandum offered by 
the Apellant was a carbon file copy extracted from the of· 
fice file of the Appellant labeled "Samak Lodge" and COi'· 
ering all the material furnished to the Respondent. Upon 
the production of the file carbon copy the Respondent ~ 
, I 
duced a white copy which had the appearance of an ong· 
inal and which did not have the notation. 
Blazzard, who testified at the trial, was as SUI'P~ 
as was counsel concerning the copy in the hands of the Re-
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spondent, for it left the appearance that Mr. Blazzard had 
deliberately used a carbon to make a copy that would imply 
to the Court that the original (which at that time the Court 
assumed was the one offered by the Respondent) also con-
tained such a notation. 
Mr. Blazzard testified concerning how he believed the 
error developed (TR 183), but because he did not have all 
of his office fiks with him, he could not produce the original 
at tl1ai time. 
At the close of the case when the Court rendered its 
judgment, the judge said in effect that Blazzard went out 
of his way to write his carbon copy with carbon-so the 
]Lidge did not believe him (TR 208). 
At the time of the motion for a new trial the judge 
said: "If what Mr. Blazzard said was true, I would be ob-
ligated to dismiss the action of the plaintiff." 
It was not until the hearing on the motion for the new 
trial that counsel for the Appellant was fully apprised of 
the feeling of prejudice the testimony had engendered in 
the judge concerning this testimony and his disbelief of 
the explanations offered. It was because of the strong 
stiitement of the judge at this hearing that the Appellant 
prepared and filed the motion to set aside the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, which motion was 
accompanied by the affidavit of Mr. Blazzard. There is 
set forth as follows the motion and affidavit: 
MOTION 
"Comes now the defendant and moves the O>urt to set 
aside the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Judgment in the above entitled case, or in the alter-
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native to allow the defendant td introduce new evi 
dence concerning matters of grave importance in :1ie 
determination of the issues raised by the pleadings in 
the above entitled action. 
The defendant allege;:; that at the time of trial and at I 
the time of the hearing on the defendant's Motion for : 
~ ~ew Trial'. the Court e~pressed itself in saying tli:i! I 
if it had belleved the test1mony of Viard W. Blamni i 
. l I co:;1c2rnmg t 1e memorandum made on the credit memc 
introduced in evidence, it would have been obligat;,J / 
to dismiss the plaintiff's case, and that it felt t:1at the j 
carbon entry on the exhibit introduced was a self-sen I 
ing addition made for the purpose of misleading tl:t 
Court. 
It is the defendant's position that the failure to intr~ 
duce the original corpy of that credit memo was the 
result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect 
and that the original of that document which refute\ 
the Court's decision constitutes newly discovered e\i 
dence which by due dilignce could not have been di> 
covered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 
59(b) for reason that the defendant did not kn::>w o: 
had no reason to believe that the Court felt the \1ir 
ness, Ward W. Blazzard's, testimony was false. TIF 
Court's expressed conclusion at the time of the hear 
ing on the defendant's Motion for a New Trial camei' 
a complete surprise to the defendant, and the exhio· 
offered is a complete explanation of the Court's em 
neous conclusion. This Motion is 'based upon the Aff 
davit of Ward W. Blazzard, together with accompani 
ing exhibit, and is based upon Rule 60(b) of Utah Rulr 
of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this 2nd day of August, 1966, at Provo, Utah ; 
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AFFIDAVIT 
"Wru·d W. Blazzard, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says: 
At the trial of the above entitled action, Invoice No. 
2200 (Sales Order D8967), a credit memo, was intro-
duced in evidence. There was a notation on the credit 
memo which did not appear on the copy of the invoice 
delivered to the buyer, Samak Lodge. That notation 
stated: "Adjustment of price due to dissatisfaction 
in laminating." I testified at the trial that after dis-
covering the purpose of the credit from my employee, 
I recorded such purpose on the invoice. 
The copy tihat was introduced at the trial was a car-
bon copy. The sales order pads used by the Kamas 
Valley Lumber Company consist of five parts, with 
fixed carbons. The first copy is the customer's copy, 
which is white. The original is also white and is filed 
in our office numerically. The yellow carbon copy 
goes into the customer's file and is filed alphabetically, 
and the orange copy is the work order and signature 
copy, which is filed numerically by sales order mun-
ber. The pink copy is a delivery slip given to tlle cus-
tomer at time of delivery. Usuually the customer's 
white invoice copy is mailed to him at statement time. 
I am advised by my attorney, Jackson B. Howard, that 
the Court stated that it believed that the notation on 
the credit memo (yellow copy introduced in Court), 
concerning the purpose of the credit's issuance, was de-
liberately written in carbon to cause the Court to be-
lieve that the copy delivered to the customer had the 
same notation on it. The explanation for the intro-
duction of the yellow carbon rather than the original 
is that the yellow copies are filed in the customer's 
file which contains all of the charges and credits to 
the custmer's account, and it was easily obtained and 
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did not require any office search. The white copi,. 
of original entry are filed numerically, and to have 
extracted all of the original invoices or sales slips would i 
have taken considerable office time. I had no rea,011 ! 
to believe that the customer's file was inadequate. ft 
now appears that the Court believes tJhe customer·, i 
white copy to be the original, when in fact the origin~ i 
is attached to this Affidavit and shows that the notJ. 1 
tion was made in pen on that document. This nota i 
tion was niade shortly after the credit was issued an1J : 
before the copies had been separated for filing ann, 
posting to the customer's account. The notation 11·:: 
not made in anticipation of litigation. 
Had I tJhought that my explanation of the entry mad1 
at Court would be misconstrued, without the proour 
tion of the original document, the original documer.: 
would certainly have been produced at the trial. It 
was not until the time of the trial that I discovered tha: 
the same entry was not on the customer's white COP! 
of the invoice. When I made the entry I did not lmow 
that the customer's white oopy had been removed ana 
sent to her. 
There is attached to this Affidavit the original oft~· 
credit memo, showing the adjustment I made shortl! 
after the issuance of the credit memo, and an orangr 
copy of the same demonstrating the authenticity oi 
the original entry, and a complete sales slip set con 
sisting of an original and four copies. f 
Dated at Provo, Utah, this 2nd day of August, 196n 1 
The hearing on the motion was held at Salt Lake Ci~. 
on the 29th day of August, 1966, on stipulation of counse: 
did no and for the convenience of the Court. The Court 
• • +n; ed the al have the file from SUlllllllt County which conu:un 
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tachment to the affidavits, but he took the matter under 
advisement. 
The hearing was after the appeal had been initiated, 
and was somewhat delayed because Judge Ellett was on 
vacation 
Judge Ellett, after reviewing the file, made the follow-
mg order, which is set out as follows: 
ORDER 
"The defendant's motion to set aside the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in the above 
entitled case having come on regularly for hearing on 
the 29th day crf August, 1966, and the Court having 
heard the arguments of counsel and having taken 1Jhe 
matter under advisement and being fully advised in 
~he premises, and the Court having found by its own 
investigation and review of the evidence that the state-
ments contained in the motion and affidavit are in fact 
true, but the Court having other good and substantial 
reasons for having ruled in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendant, 
1T IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion of 
the defendant be and the same is hereby denied. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this day of 
October, 1966. 
BY THE COURT 
While we recognize that a court may not be committed 
to oral statements made from the bench, we still believe 
that his conclusion that if he believed Blazzard he would 
have to dismiss against the respondent was indicative of 
his ju<lgment at the time and the prevailing prejudice caused 
b:- his belief that Blazzard was trying to put something 
0vrr on the Court. 
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The appellant has no desire to cast any adverse refltt. 
tions upon the trial judge and, on the contrary, counsel con 
siders Judge Ellett to be a judge of the highest calib€r; 
however, all of us are human. The appellant is reminded 
of the standard instruction given to the jury concerning ' 
deliberations, which is quoted as follows: 
"It is rarely productive or good for a juror, upon enter. 
ing the jury room, to make an emphatic expression of 
his own opinion on the case or to announce a dele'.· 
mination to stand for a certain verdict. When one 
does that at the outset, his sense of pride may bl' 
aroused, and he may hesitate to recede from an w: 
nounced position if shown that it is fallacious. Re-
member that you are not partisans or advocates in th' 
matter, but are judges." 
It is obvious from the Court's ruling that his under· 
standing of this particular fact was fallacious, yet he did : 
,;, I 
not change his position. We believe that in light of ws ~ 
previous observations concerning the strength of this el~· /I 
dence, as believed, against the Appellant, it was an abw 1 
of sound discretion nat to grant the Appellant a new trial j 
CONCLUSION ~ 
The arguments above set forth demo~rate that tlle I 
Appellant is entitled to a reversal of the Judgment or .. u, , 
ih\! alternative, a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACKSON B. HOW ARD. for 
HOW ARD & LEWIS 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 
Attorneys for Awe]Jant 
I 
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